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PAPER

READ BY

WILLIAM P. WELLS.

The Dartmouth College Case and Private Corporations.

Chancellor Kent, writing in 1826, thus expressed himself

concerning the Dartmouth College case: * "It contains one

of the most full and elaborate expositions of the constitutional

sanctity of contracts to be met with in any of the reports.

The decisjpji_in_that case did more than any other single act

proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw

PAPER

an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived

from the grant of government and to give solidity and

inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and commer-

READ BY
cial institutions of our country."

Another learned commentator, Mr. Justice Cooley, writing

nearly fifty years later, adds to his statement of the doctrine

WILLIAM P. WELLS.

established in that case the following:f "It _is_nadfir the

protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case that

the most enormouTT-and- -threatening powers in our country

have been created, some of the great and wealthy corporations

having greater influence in the country at large and upon the

The IJartmouth College Gase and Private Corporations.

legislation of the country than the states to which they owe

their corporate existence. Everyjriyilege granted or right

conferred, no matter by what means or on what pretence,

being made inviolable by the constitution, the government is

* 1 Kent's Comm. 419.

(3)
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Chancellor Kent, writing in 1826, thus expressed himself
concerning the Dartmouth College case: * "It contains one
-0£ the most full and elaborate expositions of the constitutional
sanctity of contracts to be met with in any of the reports.
The de~hat case did more t4an any other single act
proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw
.an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived
from the grant of government and to give solidity and
inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and commer-0ial institutions of our country."
Another learned commentator, Mr. Justice Cooley, writing
nearly fifty years later, adds to his statement of the doctrine
established in that case the following : t " It j§Jlllder the
protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case that
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have been created, some of the great and wealthy corporations
having greater influence in the country at large and upon the
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being made inviolable by the constitution, the government is
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frequently found stripped of its authority in very important

particulars by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation, and a

4

clause in the federal constitution, -whose purpose was to pre-

clude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and

perpetuates the evil."

During the period which has elapsed since Chancellor Kent

wrote, the great development of private corporations has taken

place in this country, their wealth and strength have im-

mensely increased, and they have become possessed, unques-

tionably, of vast and dangerous powers. And these contrasted

statements of the effects of this decision present a most inter-

esting inquiry. The first represents an opinion which pre-

vailed in the profession and in the courts long after the

decision was made, and which still receives strong support

from the bar and from the decisions of the highest tribunals.

But it must be acknowledged that the second of the foregoing

statements is only a moderate expression of professional and

public opinion upon this important subject. While, on the

one hand, it is maintained that the original adjudication was

not only right in itself, but has been rightly affirmed and

applied in succeeding cases and should not be disturbed; that

the court which originally pronounced it should not and will

not take any backward steps in respect to the doctrine estab-

lished; on the other hand, not only has the correctness of the

decision been repeatedly challenged, but a swelling chorus of
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denunciation, proceeding from lawyers and the press and the

people, assails it as fons et origo of monstrous wrong and per-

nicious consequences, and predictions manifold are not want-

ing that it must sooner or later be reviewed and reversed.

It cannot, therefore, be inappropriate for an association of the

bar of the country to consider whether the effect of this great

judgment has been beneficent or evil; whether alleged abuses

of corporate powers and alleged corporate-encroachments upon

public rights, which are at present engaging the solicitude of

lawyers, legislators and the people alike, are chiefly attributa-

ble to or find support in the decision; whether corporations

frequently found stripped of its authority in very important
particulars by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation, and a
clause in the federal constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and
perpetuates the evil."
During the period which has elapsed since Chancellor Kent
wrote, the great development of private corporations has taken
place in this country, their wealth and strength have immensely increased, and they hav_e become possessed, unquestionably, of vast and dangerous powers. And these contrasted
statements of the effects of this decision present a most interesting inquiry. The first represents an opinion which prevailed in the profession and in the courts long after the
decision was made, and which still receives strong support
from the bar and from the decisions of the highest tribunals.
But it must be acknowledged that the second of the foregoing
statements is only a moderate expression of professional and
public opinion upon this important subject. While, on the
one hand, it is maintained that the original adjudication was
not only right in itself, but has been rightly affirmed and
applied in succeeding cases and should not be disturbed ; that
the court which originally pronounced it should not and will
not take any backward steps in respect to the doctrine established ; on the other hand, not only has the correctness of the
decision been repeatedly challenged, but a swelling chorus of
denunciation, proceeding from lawyers and the press and the
people, assails it as Jons et origo of monstrous wrong and pernicious consequences, and predictions manifold are not wanting that it must sooner or later be reviewed and reversed.
It cannot, therefore, be inappropriate for an association of the
bar of the country to consider whether the effect of this great
judgment has been beneficent or evil; whether alleged abuses
of corporate powers and alleged corporate'encroachments upon
public rights, which are at present engaging the solicitude of
lawyers, legislators and the people alike, are chiefly attributable to or find support in the decision ; whether corporations

..
find in the courts under it an "impregnable barrier" behind

which they may do mischief, or only a just shelter for their

5

clear rights; whether the judicial tribunals have only justly

applied a clause of the federal constitution, or have pressed

the decision too far, with evil consequences to the people.

find in the courts under it an "impregnable barrier" behind
which they may do mischief, or only a just shelter for their
clear rights; whether the judicial tribunals have only justly
applied a clause of the federal constitution, or have pressed
the decision too far, with evil consequences to the people.
Such consideration, in other words, involves an inquiry into
the connection, real or supposed, between the Dartmouth Collage . case and the pressing questions of corporate power, responsibility and restraint which are now the subjects of great
public anxiety. But the appropriate limits of the discussion
only allow a suggestive rather than a thorough treatment of
the topic.

Such consideration, in other words, involves an inquiry into

the connection, real or supposed, between the Dartmouth Col-

lage case and the pressing questions of corporate power, re-

sponsibility and restraint which are now the subjects of great

public anxiety. But the appropriate limits of the discussion

only allow a suggestive rather than a thorough treatment of

the topic.

The inquiry first requires a brief consideration of the

doctrine established and its applications. But it is unnecessary

to examine at any length the cases in the federal and state

courts in which the principle of the leading case has been

applied, for this would be only a repetition of familiar learn-

ing. It will be sufficient to notice the well-known rules flow-

ing from the original decision, which have been administered

for the protection of private business corporations. It will

appear that the decisions, during a period of sixty-five years,

have affirmed a body of legal rules, as applications of the

doctrine of the leading case, which, to say the least, consti-

tute a strong and valuable support of corporate privileges.

A strict statement of the decision in the principal case,*

in 1819, is, that the charters of private corporations are
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contracts between the legislature and the corporations*, having

for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the

corporations assume by accepting them, and the grant of the

franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its

benefits diminished or impaired, without the consent of the

grantees, than any other grant of property or valuable thing,

unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself.

* The Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheaton, 518.

1\.

~

The inquiry first requires a brief consideration of the
doctrine established and its applications. But it is unnecessary
to examine at any length the cases in the federal and state
courts in which the principle of the leading case has been
applied, for this would be only a repetition of familiar learnmg. It will be sufl!.cient to notice the well-known rules flowing from the original decision; which have been administered
for the protection of private business corporations. It will
appear that the decisions, during a period of sixty-five years,
have affirmed a body of legal rules, as applications of the
doctrine of the leading case, which, to say the least, constitute a strong and valuable support of corporate privileges.
A strict statement of the decision in the principal case,*
in 1819, is, that the charters of p,ri".ate . c,o~p_()r~ti_ons are
contracts between the legislature and the corporation~, having
for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the
corporations assume by accepting them, and the grant of the
franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its
benefits diminished or impaired, without the consent of the
grantees, than any other grant of property or valuable thing,
unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself.
*The Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheaton, 518.

6

This principle, in subsequent cases, was held to embrace all

contracts, executed and executory, between the state and

6

private corporations;* and it was also settled that the in-

alidity of legislation impairing the contract does not depend

upon the extent of the impairment^

I. Let us consider, at the outset, the beneficial results to

corporations of the Dartmouth College case. It was inevitable,

when such a decision had been announced by the supreme

tribunal of the federal government, that corporations would

at once perceive its value to them, and be swift to seize upon

This principle, in subsequent cases, was held to embrace all
contracts, executed and executory, between the state and
private corporations;* and it was also settled that the inalidity of legislation impairing the contract does not depend
upon the extent of the impairment. t

the advantages it conferred upon them. A mere glance at

the familiar classes of cases in which the principle has been

applied, shows their variety and importance, and that business

corporations have never failed to invoke its protection when-

ever their chartered rights have been drawn into controversy.

(1) In respect to the title to corporate property, derived

from the state, other than franchises, it was soon established,

by many decisions, that legislative grants to corporations vest

an absolute title, which could not be afterwards resumed or

controlled by the legislature, any more than an absolute grant

to individuals.It having been previously decided that legis-

lative grants are irrepealable,J the decision that a charter is a

contract, brought all property granted by a charter within the

protection given to grants to individuals. The value of such

a principle to private business corporations is at once apparent.
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It is only necessary to refer to the history of state and federal

I. Let us consider, at the outset, the beneficial results tocorporations of the Dartmouth College case. It was inevitable,
when such a decision had been announced by the supreme
tribunal of the federal government, that corporations would
at once perceive its value to them, and be swift to seize upon
the advantages it conferred upon them. A mere glance at
the familiar classes of cases in which the principle has been
applied, shows their variety and importance, and that business
corporations have never failed to invoke its protection whenever their chartered·rights have been. drawn into controversy.

legislation, which has conferred upon them profuse grants of

property, to show how beneficial to corporations the adminis-

tration of this rule of law has been. The disposition to

* Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Bridge Proprietors eg. Hoboken, 1 Wall.

116.

t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Bronson t>g. Kinzie, 1 How.

311.

X Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43;

Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, Ibid. 292; Davis vs. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.

tl) In respect to the title to corporate property, derived
from the state, other than franchises, it W88 soon established,
by many decisions, that legislative grants to corporations vest
an absolute title, which could not be aft~rwards resumed' or
controlled by the legislature; any mo;;-th~~-~~ ·absolute grant
to individmds:-it havin·g·teen-pre-viously decided that legislative grants are irrepealable,t the decision that a charter is a
contract, brought all property granted by a charter within the
protection given to grants to individuals. The value of such
a principle to private business corporations is at once apparent.
It is only necessary to refer to the history of state and federal
legislation, which has conferred upon them profuse grants of
property, to show how beneficili.l to corporations the administration of this rule of law has been. The disposition to
*Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. I; Bridge Proprietors vs. Hoboken, 1 Wall.
116.
t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How.
311.
t Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43 ;Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, Ibid. 292; Davis vs. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.
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encourage corporate organization and effort, which was

especially indulged in the early history of the country, has

7

been wrought upon by corporations ever since with unflagging

energy and persistence. The public funds, the public domain,

seem to have been regarded as theirs by right, and state and

federal legislatures, influenced by all manner of solicitation

and importunity, and won by all the arts of conciliation and

persuasion, have enriched corporations by abundant and over-

flowing donations, and thus established and strengthened the

solid structure of their wealth and power.

(2) The same principle, by repeated adjudications, was held

to apply to grants of the franchises of corporations. They

were held to be property, and irrevocable by legislation, after

acceptance by the corporations, on the terms of the charters.

Great as have been the value and benefits of the large grants

"of^-pfoperty made to corporations, these are jsmall compared

with the worth of franchises which, once obtained, bestow

special and ample powers for the acquisition of property, its

encourage corporate organization and effort, which was
especially indulged in the early history of the country, has .
been wrought upon by corporations ever since with unflagging
energy and persistence. The public funds, the public domain,
seem to have been regarded as theirs by right, and state and
federal legislatures, influenced by all manner of solicitation
and importunity, and won by all the arts of conciliation and
persuasion, have enriched corporations by abundant and overflowing donations, and thus established and strengthened the
solid structure of their wealth and power.

consolidation in the hands of corporations, and afford to them

the ability and present the strong temptation to act solely for

their own aggrandizement, in disregard of the public interest.

In the early history of corporations in this country all charters

were special, each resting upon its own terms, and granting

varied privileges, always specially valuable. The development

of the country and its resources justified- the liberal encour-
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agement of corporate enterprises, and the grants and fran-

chises conferred by charters were given upon sound consider-

ations of public policy and benefit to the country. But all

business corporations, by the subsequent application to them

of the decision in the principal case, gained enormous power,

and secured a firm foothold for action which inevitably resulted

in aggressions upon the public.

If it be said, as must be conceded, that the inviolability of

grants to corporations, other than franchises, confers upon

them no rights beyond those given by grants to natural

(2) The same principle, by repeated adjudications, was held
to apply to grants of the franchises of corporations. They
were held to be property, and irrevocable by legislation, after
acceptance by the corporations, on the terms of the charters.
Gr~s have been the value and ben.efits of the large grants
-or-property made to corporations, the~ll compared
with the worth of franchises which, once obtained, bestow
special and ample powers for. the acquisition of property, its
consolidation in the hands of corporations, and afford to them
the ability and present the strong temptation to act solely for
their own aggrandizement, in disregard of the public interest.
In the early history of corporations in this country all charters
were special, each resting upon its own terms, and granting
varied privileges, always specially valuable. The development
of the country and its resources justified· the liberal encour1 agement of corporate enterprises, and the grants and fran\ chises conferred by charters were given upon sound consideri ations of public policy and benefit to the country. But all
/ business corporations, by the subsequent application to them
of the decision in the principal case, gained enormous power,
and secured a firm foothold for action which inevitably resulted
in aggressions upon the public.
If it be said, as must be conceded, that the inviolability of
grants to corporations, other than franchises, confers upon
them no rights beyond those given by grants to natural

8

persons, upon sufficient consideration, and rests upon principles

of justice and morality applicable alike to natural and

8

artificial persons, it may be replied that the chief advantage

which has been derived by corporations from the Dartmouth

College decisions the removal of their franchises "from legis-

lative control, the constant exercise of which is essential to

the public welfare. By the bestowal of such franchises there

are conferred upon corporate and associated capital powers

which individuals cannot have, powers for good certainly, but

also powers for evil, which have been exercised to such public

detriment that the people have been stirred to their depths by a

sense of the immediate and urgent necessity of finding,

under the law and through the judicial tribunals, or above and

outside of them, some effectual means of restraint upon

corporate abuses.

(3) In respect to the use and enjoyment of corporate pro-

perty and franchises, it must be admitted that the principal

decision has been the source of the same priceless advantages

to corporations. The special charters which were granted

under the influence of the sentiment favorable to corporations,

which prevailed alike in legislatives and in courts, generally

included special privileges in the use of corporate franchises

and the carrying on of corporate business. When secured,

these are irrevocable. Corporations thereby become possessed

of the power to determine, without restriction and without

persons, upon sufficient consideration, and rests upon principles
of justice and .morality applicable alike to natural and
artificial persons,. it may be replied that the chief advantage
which has been cierived by corporations from the Dartmouth
CoJlege decisim/is the rE)moval of their franchiseslrOfiliegtslati ve.. cont~~l, the constant exercise of'·which is essential to
the public welfare. By the bestowal of such franchises there
are conferred upon corporate and associated ca.pita! powers
which individuals cannot have, powers for good certainly, but
also powers for evil, which have been exercised to such public
detriment that the people have been stirred to their depths by a
sense of the immediate and urgent necessity of finding,
under the law and through the judicial tribunals, or above and
outside of them, some effectual means of restraint upon
corporate abuses.

Generated for mpgreen (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-11 16:38 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b39933
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

legislative control, the compensation they shall receive for

services, the profits from the use of their property, "its use

and the fruits of that use." In innumerable cases, in the

state and federal courts, the special provisions of charters to

this end have been held to be beyond legislative interference

under the principle of the DartmouthuCollege decision. The

benefits thereby secured to corporations need no description.

The advantages are obvious which they have derived from the

principle that the right to regulate and fix their own compen-

sation for services results from their general power to carry on

(3) In respect to the use and enjoyment of corporate property and franchises, it must be admitted that the principal
decision has been the source of the same priceless advantages
to corporations. The special cnarters which were granted
under the influence of the se~nt favorable to corporations,
which prevailed alike in legislatp\'es and in courts, generally
included special privileges in the use of corporate franchises
and the carrying on of corporate business. When secured,
these are irrevocable. Corporations thereby become possessed
of the power to determine, without restriction and without
legislative control, the compensation they shall receive for
services, the profits from the use of their property, "its use
and the fruits of that use." In innumerable cases, in the
· state and federal courts, the special provisions of charters to
this end have been held to be beyond legislative interference
under the prin~iple of t~~J)art~ decision. The
benefits thereby' seciifea to corporations need no description.
The advantages are obvious which they have derived from the
principle that the right to regulate and fix their own compensation forservices results from their general power to carry on

9

the business for which they are organized, and that such com-

pensation must be determined by the corporate body itself.

9

The authorities to this effect were uniform* until the compara-

tively recent decisions of the Supreme Court as to the regula-

tion of corporate business, which will be considered hereafter.

It is against this right and this power of corporations to

determine their own charges, and the undeniable abuses thereof,

that the public sentiment referred to has been especially

directed, and which, not yet wholly allayed, though diminished,

has, unintelligently perhaps, found in the leading case the

sole source of corporate injuries to the public.

(4) The exemption of private corporations from taxation

altogether and taxation at special and favorable rates, under

charter provisions, have been of such advantage to them that,

more than any other of their privileges, perhaps, these have

encountered the disapproval and opposition of the people and

the profession; and the established rules of law protecting

such exemptions have challenged, probably, more severe

criticism than any application of the Dartmouth College

decision. The principle that the legislature may make an

the business for which they are organized~ and that such compensation must be determined , by the corporate body itself.
The authorities to this effect were uniform* until the comparatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court as to the .regulation of corporate business, which will be considered hereafter.
It is against this right and this power of corporations to
determine their own charges, and the undeniable abuses thereof,
that the public sentiment referred to has been especially
directed, and which, not yet wholly allayed, though diminished, 't
has, unintelligently perhaps, found in the leading case the ,
sole source of corporate injuries to the public.

irrevocable contract of exemption from taxation does not rest

in its origin upon that decision, It found its earliest asser-

tion in the case of New Jersey vs. Wilson, f in 1812, and the

succeeding cases which affirm the rule profess to rest upon

that case.J The decision was, that under the constitution
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the repeal of a law granting total or partial exemption from

*Penn. E. E. Co. vs. Sly, 65 Penn. St. 205; Phil, Wilm. & Bait. E. E.

Co. vs. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506; Hamilton vs. Kutte, 5 Bueh, (Ky.) 458.

t 7 Cranch, 164.

t Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Piqua Bank vs. Knoop,

16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Dodge

vs. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mech. and Traders Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How.

384; McGee vs. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Jefferson Bank vs. Skelly, 1 Black,

436; Home of the Friendless vs. Eouse, 8 Wall. 438; Wilmington Bail-

road vs. Eeid, 13 Wall. 264; Farrington vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679!

Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.

(4) The exemption of private corporations from taxation
altogether and taxation at special and favorable rates, under
charter provisions, have been of such advantage to them that,
more than any other of their privileges, perhaps, these have
encountered the disapproval and opposition of the people and
the profession; and the established rules of law protecting
such exemptions have challenged, probably, more severe
criticism than any application of the Dartmouth College
decision. The principle that the legislature may make an
irrevocable contract of exemption from taxation does not rest
in its origin upon that decision, It found its earliest assertion in the case of New Jersey vs. Wilson, tin 1812, and the
succeeding cases which affirm the rule profess to rest upon
that case.t The decision was, that under the constitution
the repeal of a law granting total or partial exemption from
*Penn. R. R. Co. vs. Sly, 65 Penn. St. 205; Phil., Wilm. & Bait. R. R.
Co. vs. Bowers, 4 Roust. 506; Hamilton vs. Kutte, 5 Bush, (Ky.) 458.
t 7 Cranch, 164.
t Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Piqua Bank i•s. Knoop,
16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Dodge
vs. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mech. and Traders Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How.
384; McGee vs. Mathis, 4 Wall.143; Jefferson Bank v.~. Skelly, 1 Black,
436; Home of the Friendless 11s. Rouse, 8 Wall. 438; Wilmington Railroad t•s. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Farrington t•s. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 i
Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.

10

taxation impairs the contract made by the grant of the privi-

lege. Whether or not it was rightly decided that the prohibi-

10

tion of the constitution applied to the exemption in question

in the case, it has remained as the basis of subsequent decis-

ions and has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court,

though not without most strenuous dissent by a strong minor-

ity of the court. But it is by virtue of the decision in the

Dartmouth College case that the principle has its application

to private corporations. The decision that a charter is a

contract made available to them the doctrine that contracts of

exemption from taxation are protected by the constitution,

notwithstanding that the states are, by such contracts, deprived

of the exercise of one of the powers of sovereignty. And

the majority of the cases in which the principle established in

New Jersey vs. Wilson has been affirmed have been cases

where corporate charters providing for exemption from taxa-

tion have been drawn in question. In one of these cases it is

said that " attempted state taxation is the mode most frequently

adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhi-

bition. It most frequently calls for the exercise of our super-

visory power."*

And this supervisory power the court ha3 steadily exercised

to declare void all state legislation impairing contracts of

exemption made with corporations in their charters. Not-

withstanding the earnest opposition and protests of the
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minority of the court, at all times, the majority has not failed

to protect the contract of exemption when the provisions of

the charter clearly expressed it. And one of the minority

has not hesitated to say that the court has been " at times

quick to discover a contract, that it might be protected, and

slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts were not

so, by reason of the want of authority in those who profess to

bind others. This has been especially apparent in regard to

contracts made by legislatures of states, and by those municipal

* Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. 8. 432.

taxation impairs the contract made by the grant of the privilege. Whether or not it was rightly decided that the prohibition of the constitution applied to the exemption in question
in the case, it has remained as the basis of subsequent decisions and has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court,
though not without most strenuous dissent by a strong minority of the court. But it is by virtue of the decision in the
Dartmouth College case that the principle has its application
to private corporations. The decision that a charter is a
contract made available to them the doctrine that contracts of
exemption from taxation are protected by the constitution, ,
notwithstanding that the states are, by such contracts, deprived
of the exercise of one of the powers of sovereignty. And
the majority of the cases in which the principle established in
New Jersey vs. "Wilson has been affirmed have been cases
where corporate charters providing for exemption from taxation have been drawn in question. In one of these cases it is
said that" attempted state taxation is the mode most frequently
adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhibition. It most frequently calls for the exercise of our supervisory power."*
·
And this supervisory power the court has steadily exercised
to declare void all state legislation impairing contracts of
exemption made with corpo~ations in their charters. Notwithstanding the earnest opposition and protests of the
minority of the court, at all times, the majority has not failed
to protect the contract of exemption when the provisions of
the charter clearly expressed it. And one of the minority
has not hesitated to say that the court has been "at times
quick to discover a contract, that it might be protected, and
slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts were not
so, by reason of the want of authority in those who profess to
bind others. This has been especially apparent i~ regard to
contracts made by legislatures of states, and by those municipal

* Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. 8. 432.

11

bodies to whom, in a limited measure, some part of the legis-

lative function has been confided."*

11

It is believed to be the general opinion of the profession

that if the question whether a state legislature can release the

sovereign power of taxation were res integra, it would be

decided in the negative by every judicial tribunal, state and

federal. Discriminations in respect to taxation, favorable to

corporations, originally granted in conformity with the public

sentiment, which, as has been said, encouraged them by

favoring legislation, are now seen to be unwise and un-

necessary. The time when corporations need such support or

encouragement long ago passed away. The public, which

once looked with favor upon their privileges, is now alarmed by

their encroachments, and the profession and the public alike

realize the consequences of the doctrine, that under the

decision of the Dartmouth College case the essential sovereign

powers of a state relating to revenue, which ought to be

most sacredly guarded and conserved, may be bartered away

in favor of corporations, whose influence upon legislation has

been almost irresistible, and whose privileges have been often

secured by the exercise of "the sly and stealthy arts to which

state legislatures are exposed, and the greedy appetites of

adventurers for monopolies and immunities from the state

right of government."! If the Dartmouth College case had

* Miller, J., in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 442.
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t Since the above was written, the decision in Given vs. Wright, 117

U. S. 648, has been announced, affirming anew the case of New Jersey vs.

Wilson, and bringing to notice the singular fact, that the exemption sus-

tained in that case, originally granted to the Delaware Indians, which

passed to the purchasers of their lands, was not insisted upon by the

holders of the lands, and taxes were paid for the whole period of about

sixty years since the original decision. Given vs. Wright decides that the

long acquiescence of the land-owners under the imposition of taxes,

raised a presumption that the exemption which once existed had been

surrendered, as it was a franchise or privilege which could be lost by

acquiescence. The court expresses the opinion that if the question in

New Jersey vs. Wilson were a new one, it might be differently decided.

bodies to whom, in a limited measure, some part of the legislative function has been confided."*
It is believed to be the general opinion of the profession
that if the question whether a state legislature can release the
sovereign power of taxation were res integra, it would be
decided in the negative by every judicial tribunal, state and
federal. Discriminations in respect to taxation, favorable to
corporations, originally granted in conformity with the public
sentiment, which, as has been said, encouraged them by
favoring legislation, are now seen to be unwise and unnecessary. The time when corporations need such support or
encouragement long ago passed away. The public, which
once looked with favor upon their privileges, is now alarmed by
their encroachments, and the profession and the public alike
realize the consequences of the doctrine, that under the
decision of the Dartmouth College case the essential sovereign
powers of a state relating to revenue, which ought to be
most sacredly guarded and conserved, may be bartered away
in favor of corporations, whose influence upon legislation has
been almost irresistible, and whose privileges have been often
secured by the exercise of "the sly and stealthy arts to which
state legislatures are exposed, and the greedy appetites of
adventurers for monopolies and immunities from the state
right of government."t If the Dartmouth College case had
*Miller, J., in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 442.
t Since the above was written, the decision in Given vs. Wright, 117
U.S. 648, has been announced, affirming anew the case of New Jersey vs.
Wilson, and bringing to notice the singular fact, that the exemption sustained in that case, originally granted to the Delaware Indians, which
passed to the purchasers of their lands, was not insisted upon by the
holders of the lands, and taxes were paid for the whole period of about
sixty years since the original decision. Given vs. Wright decides that the
long acquiescence of the land-owners under the imposition of taxes,
raised a presumption that the exemption which once existed had been
surrendered, as it was a franchise or privilege which could be lost by
acquiescence. The court expresses the opinion that if the question in
New Jersey tl8, Wilt1on were a new one, it might be differently decided.
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been nothing more to corporations than the basis of their pro-

12

tection against taxation, it wCuld~haTe~<ieserved, even then, as

the principle has been actually applied, the protests found in

the dissenting opinions of the judges, the criticism of the

profession and the complaints of the people.

II. Here, then, we have the established principles, resting

upon the Dartmouth College case, under which corporations

have complete protection for their corporate rights and fran-

chises, the title and use of corporate property, immunities

and exemptions in respect to taxation, safety from any alter-

ation or impairment of the rights and the proprietary condi-

been nothinz_~gre to corporations than the basis of their protection against taxaUOii;--lt ~served, even then, as
the principle has been actually applied, the protests found in
the dissenting opinions of the judges, the criticism of the
profession and the complaints of the people.
•

tion secured by their charters. These are the direct results

of that decision. But it is also the foundation upon which

private business corporations in this country are grounded,

for injurious~'as well as beneficent purposes. Under it they

have found a position from which they are enabled to deliver

the heavy fire, and carrry on the noxious warfare, of cor-

porate abuses and injustice. It is the shelter under which

the vast capital embarked in corporate business may be

employed not only in serving the people but in oppressing

them. The connection between this state of things and the

decision may be traced by the simple inquiry, what would

have been the condition of private corporations if the decision

had not been made? The answer is, that they would have

remained subject to complete~Iegislative supervision and con-
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trol. If this is desirable it would seem that it can only be

brought about now by retracing the path in which the Dart-

mouth College case was the first step. Whether it is desirable

or not there is a difference of opinion; whether it is likely to

be accomplished is still more doubtful. But that the decision,

strong and fixed in our jurisprudence by repeated affirma-

tions, venerable and by many regarded with a veneration

which stigmatizes as profane any criticism of its principles,

stands, until explicitly reversed, in the way of the complete

legislative restraint of corporations, is certain.

II. Here, then, we have the established principles, resting
upon the Dartmouth College case, under which corporations
have complete protection for their corporate rights and franchises, the title and use of corporate property, immunities
I
: anu exemptions in respect to taxation, safety from any alter'. ation or impairment of the rights and the proprietary condition secured by their charters. These are the direct results
of that decision. But it is also the foundation upon which
priv~te business corporations in this country are grounded,
for inj~ousli:s well as beneficent purposes. Under it they
have found a position from which they are enabled to deliver
the heavy fire, and carrry on the noxious warfare, of corporate abuses and injustice. It is the shelter under which
the vast capital embarked in corporate business may be
employed not only in serving the people but in oppressing
them. The connection between this state of things and the
decision may be traced by the simple inquiry, what would
have been the condition of private corporations if the decision
had not been made? The answer is, that they would Jiave
remained subject to completeieglsTafive ·supervision and coritrQI~ __ If this is desirable it would seem -that it can only.be
brought about now by retracing the path in which the Dartmouth College case was the first step. Whether it is desirable
or not there is a difference of opinion; whether it is likely to
be accomplished is still more doubtful. But that the decision,
strong and fixed in our jurisprudence by repeated affirmations, venerable and by many regarded with a veneration
which stigmatizes as profane any criticism of its principles,
stands, until explicitly reversed, in the way of the complete
legislative restraint of corporations, is certain.

13

It is indisputable, therefore, that the beneficial results of

the decision to private corporations have been inestimable. It

13

has secured to them, beyond recall, enormous privileges and

powers. It is the corner-stone of a structure of corporate

wealth and influence, which has been broadening and rising

higher with every succeeding year. It has encouraged them

in independence of the legislative and popular will, and offers to

them a constant temptation to wield their vast resources solely

for their own aggrandizement. It forbids legislation, however

desirable, which is often essential to the public welfare. All

this may be fairly said without partaking of a spirit of unrea-

soning hostility to corporations. The criticism of the original

decision which asserts that it has been the source of such

priceless benefits to corporations is rational and just. No

judicial mind could have anticipated, at the time of the de-

cision, the extent of subsequent applications of a principle

declared in the case of a college to business corporations, any

more than the extensive and varied growth of corporations

could have been foreseen. But, from the beginning, the

application of the rule to the charters of business corporations

has been asserted and defended as necessary to stimulate Cor-

porate enterprise and investments.* However this may have

been, it is certain that there is some foundation for professional

and public opinion that the principle of the leading case has

been pressed too far in the courts; that not only has reason-
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able encouragement been afforded to corporate exertion, but

that it has emboldened corporations in independence, in inva-

sions of public right and in abuses of their lawful powers.

III. The larger part of professional and lay criticism upon

the Dartmouth College case and its results has been directed

against the Supreme Court, asserting that the principle has

been pressed too far, to the advantage of corporations and the

protection of vested interests; that it has "been made to

* The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 74.

It is indisputable, therefore, that the beneficial results of
. the decision to private corporations have been inestimable. It
has secured to them, beyond recall, enormous privileges and
\ powers. It is the corner-stone of a structure of corporate
wealth and influence,"which has been broadening and rising
higher with every succeeding year. It has encouraged them
in independence of the legislative and popular will, and offers to
them a constant temptation to wield their vast resources solely
for their own aggrandizement. It forbids legislation, however
desirable, which is often essential to the public welfare. All
this may be fairly said without partaking of a spirit of unreasoning hostility to corporations. The criticism of the original
decision which asserts that it has been the source of such
priceless benefits to corporations is rational and just. No
j:;;dicial mind could have anticipated, at the time of the decision, the extent of subsequent applications of a principle
declared in the case of a college to business corporations, any
more than the extensive and varied growth of corporations
could have been foreseen. But, from the beginning, the
application of the rule to the charters of business corporations
has been asserted and defended as necessary to stimulate corporate enterprise and investments.* However this may have
been, it is certain that there is some foundation for professional
and public opinion that the principle of the leading case has
been pressed too far in the courts ; that not only has reasonable encouragement been afforded to corporate exertion, but
that it has emboldened corporations in independence, in invasions of public right and in abuses of their lawful powers.
III. The larger part of professional and lay criticism upon
the Dartmouth College case and its results has been directed
against the Supreme Court, asserting that the principle has
been pressed too far, to the advantage of corporations and the
protection of vested interests; that it has "been made to
*The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 74.

14

sustain grants which neither law nor justice nor sound prin-

ciple can sanction;" that "the rule in that case has been

14

perverted to the maintenance of corporate institutions invested

with great public functions."* This is apart from the question

of the soundness of the original decision, which has been

repeatedly challenged and discussed with great research and

ability,f but which is not within the purpose of this paper.

In estimating the force and justice of such animadversions,

it is necessary to consider the principal case and the later

decisions founded upon it, and the course of decision in the

Supreme Court alone, regarded as a body or system of legal

doctrine. Of this the constituents are:

(1) The principle that the charter of a private corporation

is a contract. The court has firmly and steadily applied this

principle in cases of business corporations, and whenever the

contract has been found in the charter it has been protected

from impairment or violation, and legislation to that effect has

been held invalid. Thus business corporations have been

secured in the possession and enjoyment of every privilege,

exemption and benefit clearly conferred by charters; in the

irrevocable title to property and franchises granted; in the

exclusion of competing corporate enterprises and works; in

freedom from increased public burdens; in the right to the

use and enjoyment of their property and franchises; in im-

munity from legislative control.J And the court has never
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* See, as representative of such criticism, a very interesting and able

address by Hon. John A. Jameson, of Chicago, before the Illinois State

Bar Association, January 6, 1882, upon " Interference by Law with the

Accumulation and Use of Capital."

t See especially "The Dartmouth College Case," vol. viii., American

Law Beview, p. 189, January, 1874, and Mr. Shirley's volume, "The

Dartmouth College Causes and the Supreme Court of the United States,"

St. Louis, 1879.

X Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Trustees of Vincennes Univ.

vs. Indiana, 14 How. 268; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73; Davis vs.

Gray, 16 Wall. 203; New Jersey vs. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; New Orleans

(ias and Water Cases, 115 U. S. 650; and the whole series of taxation

cases, cited supra.

sustain grants which neither law nor justice nor sound principle can sanction; " that " the rule in that case has been
perverted to the maintenance of corporate institutions invested
with great public functions."* This is apart from the question
of the soundness of the original decision, which has been
repeatedly challenged and discussed with great research and
ability, t but which is not within the purpose of this paper.
In estimating the force and justice of such animadversions,
it is necessary to consider the principal case and the later
decisions founded upon it, and the course of decision in the
SuPfeme Court alone, regarded as a body or system of legal
doctrine. Of this the constituents are :
(1) The principle that the charter of a private corporation
is a contract. The court has firmly and steadily applied this
principle in cases of business corporations, and whenever the
contract has been found in the charter it has been protected
from impairment or violation, and legislation to that effect has
been held invalid. Thus business corporations have been
secured in the possession and enjoyment of every privilege,
exemption and benefit clearly conferred by charters ; in the
irrevocable title to property and franchises granted; in the
exclusion of competing corporate enterprises and works; in
freedom from increased public burdens; in the right to the
use and enjoyment of their property and franchises ; in immunity from legislative control.! And the court has never
*See, as representative of such criticism, a very interesting and able
addreRs by Hon. John A. Jameson, of Chicago, before the Illinois State
Bar Association, January 6, 1882, upon "Interference by Law with the
Accumulation and Use of Capital."
t See especially " The Dartmouth College Case," vol. viii., American
Law Review, p. 189, January, 1874, and Mr. Shirley's volume, "The
Dartmouth College Causes and the Supreme Court of the United States,"
St. Louis, 1879.
t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Trustees of Vincennes Univ.
vs. Indiana, 14 How. 268; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73; Davis vs.
Gray, 16 Wall. 203; New Jersey vs. Yard, 95 U.S. 104; New Orleans
Gas and Water Cases, 115 U. S. 650; and the whole series of taxation
cases, cited supra.

15

15

failed to declare its adherence to the principal case and the

improbability of its reversal in the most explicit terms, thus,

"The principles they maintain are now axiomatic in American

jurisprudence."* Again, "The question decided in that [the

Dartmouth College] case has since been considered as finally

settled in the jurisprudence of the entire country. Murmurs

of doubt and dissatisfaction are occasionally heard, but there

has been no re-argument here and none has been asked for."f

And again, it is said that the courts "are estopped from ques-

tioning the doctrine."^ Again, "The doctrines * * an-

nounced by this court more than sixty years ago have become

so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to

make them to all intents and purposes a part of the constitution

itself."§

The legal profession will not readily unite in support of a

demand, however urgently it may be pressed by popular opin-

ion, that the Supreme Court shall reverse the original decision.

Every sanction which establishes the maxim, stare decisis,

forbids this. It was made upon the greatest deliberation.

The authority of the greatest names in our judicial annals

supports it. Their successors, through a period of more than

sixty-five years, have affirmed and followed it. Whether

right or wrong, it is now too late to overthrow it. Vested

interests and rights, the investments of millions, great and

beneficent works and enterprises depend upon its permanence.
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The language of Mr. Justice Davis is not too strong when he

says that ||" the security of property rests upon it, and every

successful enterprise is undertaken in the unshaken belief that

it will never be forsaken. A departure from it now would

involve dangers to society not to be foreseen, would shock the

sense of justice of the country, and weaken if not destroy

* Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.

f Farrington vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 685.

j The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73.

I Stone vs. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 816.

|| The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73.

failed to declare its adherence to the principal case and the
improbability of its reversal in the most explicit terms, thus,
" The principles they maintain are now axiomatic in American
jurisprudence."* Again, "The question decided in that [the
Dartmouth CollegeJ case has since been considered as finally
settled in the jurisprudence of the entire country. Murmurs
of doubt and dissatisfaction are occasionally heard, but there
has been no re-argument here and none has been asked for."t
And again, it is said that the courts "are estopped from questioning the doctrine."! Again, "The doctrines * * announced by this court more than sixty years ago have become
so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to
make them to all intents and purposes a part of the constitution
itself."§
The legal profession will not readily unite in support of a
demand, however urgently it may be pressed by popular opinion, that the Supreme Court shall reverse the original decision.
Every sanction which establishes the maxim, stare decisis,
forbids this. It was made upon the greatest deliberation.
The authority of the greatest names in our judicial annals
supports it. Their successors, through a period of more than
sixty-five years, have affirmed and followed it. Whether
right or wrong, it is now too late to overthrow it. Vested
interests and rights, the investments of millions, great and
beneficent works and enterprises depend upon its permanence.
The language of Mr. Justice Davis is not too strong when he
says that II" the security of property rests upon it, and every
successful enterprise is undertaken in the unshaken belief that
it will never be · forsaken. A departure from it now would
involve dangers to society not to be foreseen, would shock the
sense of justice of the country, and weaken if not destroy

*
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Farrington vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 685.
The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73.
Stone vs. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 816.
The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73.
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that respect which has always been felt for the judicial de-

partment of the government." It is often said that every

persistent popular demand finally obtains what it desires, even

from the judicial tribunals. But there is little ground for the

expectation that this case will be reversed under any conceiv-

able pressure of public sentiment. It will continue to be the

subject of adverse criticism, which will be intensified and

strengthened, in the profession and outside of it, unless cor-

porate abuses are restrained or come to an end. But the

remedies for these, it is believed, will be found in some other

way than in the reversal, by the court itself, of this memorable

judgment.

(2) Although the leading case has thus been repeatedly

affirmed and declared to be unassailable, we find it qualified

and limited by important adjudications which have established

principles operating in a high degree to confine and lessen

its effect in encouraging the independence and aggressions of

corporations. When it became settled that grants to them

were not to be extended by construction, and that all charters

were to be construed strictly against the grantees,* whatever

that respect which has always been felt for the judicial department' of the government." It is often said that every
persistent popular demand finally obtains what it desires, even
from the judicial tribunals. But there is little ground for the
expectation that this case will be reversed under any conceivable pressure of public sentiment. It will continue to be the
subject of adverse criticism, which will be intensified and
strengthened, in the profession and outside of it, unless corporate abuses are restrained or come to an end. But the
remedies for these, it is believed, will be found in some other
way than in the reversal, by the court itself, of this memorable
.judgment.

criticism may be made upon the doctrine or its consistency

with the Dartmouth College case, it is certain that a check

was thereby laid upon the effect of the principal decision, i

And the rule established in the Charles River Bridge case has

been repeatedly afiirmed and stands as firmly as the rule that
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a charter is a contract. This principle has been steadily

applied where corporations have invoked the protection of the

constitutional inhibition, under charters which contained no

clear contract, and in administering the rule the Supreme

Court has denied the claims of many corporations to the ex-

clusive privileges, beneficial exemptions and valuable grants

♦Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Richmond

R. R. Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Perrine vs. Canal Co., 9 How.

172 j Turnpike Co. vs. State, 3 Wall. 210; Ruggles vs. Illinois, 108 U. S.

526.

(2) Although the leading case has thus been repeatedly
affirmed and declared to be unassailable, we find it qualified
and limited by important adjudications which have established
principles operating in a high degree to confine and lessen
its effect in encouraging the independence and aggressions of
corporations. When it became settled that grants to them
were not to be extended by construction, and that all charters
were to be construed strictly against the grantees,* whatever
criticism may be made upon the doctrine or its consistency
with the Dartmouth College case, it is certain that a check
was thereby laid upon the effect of the principal decision. ,
And the rule established in the Charles River Bridge case has
been repeatedly affirmed and stands as firmly as the rule that
a charter is a contract. This principle has been steadily
applied where corporations have invoked the protection of the
constitutional inhibition, under charters which contained no
clear contract, and in administering the rule the Supreme
Court has denied the claims of many corporations to the exclusive privileges, beneficial exemptions and valuable grants

* Charles River Bridge i•s. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Richmond
R. R. Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Perrine vs. Canal Co., 9 How.
172; Turnpike Co. vs. State, 3 Wall. 210; Ruggles vs. Illinois, 108 U.S.
526.
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asserted under charters. Under this principle corporations

have been apprised that the securing of a loosely-drawn charter

17

was not enough to confer upon them all the rights and privi-

leges expected, that charters convey nothing by implication,*

and that they are always subject to the scrutiny of the judicial

power, under a rule of strict construction. The effect of such

adjudications upon charter legislation has undoubtedly been

beneficial. It has made legislatures aware that if it was

intended to confer an irrevocable franchise, privilege or ex-

emption, that purpose must be clearly expressed. Many a

legislature, brought face to face with an explicit charter-

contract, would hesitate to enact it, while a skillfully drawn

charter, intended by its promoters to contain but not express

a contract, might pass unchallenged. Thus, this important

rule of the construction of charters, in its actual application,

has been favorable to the public as against corporations.

(3) The Supreme Court has asserted and upheld the legis-

lative authority over corporations in all cases where their

charters, or the general laws, or the provisions of state

* Especially in the taxation cases the court has held that the contract

must be clearly expressed in the charter. Providence Bank vs. Billings, 4

Pet. 514; Salt Co. vs. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; The Delaware R. R.

Tax Cases, 18 Wall. 225; Tucker vs. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; New Jersey

vs. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Hoge vs. R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 348; Railway Co. vs.

Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 539; Memphis Gas Light Co. vs. Shelby Tax
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District, 109 U. S. 398; Southwest. R. R. Co. vs. Wright, 116 U. S. 231,';

asserted under charters. Under this principle corporations
have been apprised that the securing of a loosely-drawn charter
was not enough to confer upon them all the rights and privileges expected, that charters convey nothing by implication,*
and that they are always subject to the scrutiny of the judicial
power, under a rule of strict construction. The effect of such
adjudications upon charter legislation has undoubtedly been
beneficial. It has made legislatures aware that if it was
intended to co~fer an irrevocable franchise, privilege or ex.emption, that purpose must be clearly expressed. Many a
legislature, brought face to face with an explicit chartercontract, would hesitate to enact it, while a skillfully drawn
charter, intended by its promoters to contain but not express
a contract, might pass unchallenged. Thus, this important
rule of the construction of charters, in its actual application,
has been favorable to the public as against corporations.

Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. vs. Dennis, 116 U. S. 668 ; Tennessee s. Whit-

worth, 117 U. S. 139-148. And the privilege of exemption from taxation

is construed to be the special privilege of the corporation to which it is

granted, and does not pass to its successor unless the law granting the ex-

emption expresses a clear intent to that effect. Morgan vs. Louisiana, 93

U. S. 217; Wilson vs. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417; Louisville & Nashville R. R.

(3) The Supreme Court has asserted and upheld the legislative authority over corporations in all cases where their
charters, or the general laws, or the provisions of state

Co. vs. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. R. Co. vs. Commissioners, 112

U. S. 609. And exemptions from taxation which are mere bounties, or

privileges granted without consideration, may be withdrawn or repealed

by the legislature. Rector, etc., us Philadelphia, 24 How. 301; Tucker lis.

Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; West Wisconsin vs. Board of Supervisors, 93

U. S. 595.

*Especially in the taxation cases the court has held that the contract
must be clearly expressed in the charter. Providence Bank VB. Billings, 4
Pet. 514; Salt Co. VB. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; The Delaware R. R.
Tax Cases, 18 Wall. 225; Tucker VB. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527 ; New J ereey
v1. Yard, 95 U.S. 104; Hoge VB. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 348; Railway Co. vs.
Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 539; Memphis Gas Light Co. VB. Shelby Tax
District, 109 U. S. 398; Southwest. R.R. Co. VB. Wright, 116 U.S. 231:;
Vicksburg, etc., R.R. Co. w. Dennis, 116 U.S. 668; Tennessee s. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139-148. And the privilege of exemption from taxation
is construed to be the special privilege of the corporation to which it is
granted, and does not pass to its succe@sor unless the law granting the exemption expres.qes a clear intent to that effect. Morgan VB. Louisiana, 93
U.S. 217; Wilson vB. Gaines, 103 U.S. 4li; Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. vs. Palmes, 109 U. S. 2-14; Memphis R. R. Co. VB. Commissioners, 112
_U. S. 609. And exemptions frotn taxation which are mere bounties, or
privileges granted without consideration, may be withdrawn or repealed
by the legislature. Rector, etc., VB Philadelphia, 24 How. 301; Tucker va.
Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; West Wi'lconsin vs. Board of Supervisors, 93
u. s. 595.

18

constitutions reserved to the legislature the power of amendment

or repeal. This means of retaining the control of corporate

18

charters, and of avoiding "the unalterable and irrepealable

character of the contract," has been in force since the decision

of the principal case, and a suggestion by Judge Story to that

effect in his opinion was immediately followed, and many of

the states, availing themselves of this mode of action, have

maintained a supervision of corporations which has been

effectivcin a high degree. The court has never failed to give

the state and the public the benefit of this principle, whenever

the charter, or general law, or the state constitution has

reserved the power. In a multitude of cases, corporations

have been denied the privileges asserted under charters claimed

to be irrepealable, and have been subjected to the efficient

action of the legislative power.*

As the power to amend and repeal charters would be ample

in the state legislatures, in the absence of the provision of the

federal constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation

of contracts, such a reservation leaves a state where any

sovereignty would be, if unrestrained by express constitutional

limitations. Whenever the power is reserved, it may be

exercised to amend the charter to almost any extent to carry

into effect the original purposes of the corporate organization

and secure due administration of its affairs, or to repeal the

charter altogether, so as to terminate absolutely the existence
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of the corporation by the abrogation of "the organic law on

which the corporate existence depends, "f But the exercise of

the power of amendment or repeal cannot deprive corporations

of their rights or property acquired by the use of their

* Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 213; Miller vs. State, 15 Wall.

478; Tomlinson vs. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319;

Railway Co. vs. Maine, 96 U. S. 499; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700.

Railway Co. vs. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Railway vs. Philadelphia, 101

U. S. 539; Greenwood vs. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Spring Valley Water

Works vs. Schottler, 110 U. S. 348.

t Miller vs. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Green-

wood vs. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 19.

constitutions reserved to the legislature the power of amendment
or repeal. This means of retaining the control of corporate
charters, and of avoiding "the unalterable and irrepealable
character of the contract," has been in force since the decision
of the principal case, and a suggestion by Judge Story to ,that
effect in his opinion was immediately followed, and many of
the states, availing themselves of this mode of action, have
maintained a supervision of corporations which has been
effective1in a high degree. The court has never failed to give
the state and the public the benefit of this principle, whenever
the charter, or general law, or the state constitution has
reserved the power. In a multitude of cases, corporations
have been denied the privileges asserted under charters claimed
to be irrepealable, and have been subjected to the efficient
action of the legislative power.*
As the power to amend and repeal charters would be ample
in the state legislatures, in the absence of the provision of the
federal constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation
of contracts, such a reservation leaves a state where any
sovereignty would be, if unrestrained by express constitutional
limitations. 'Vhenever the power is reserved, it may be
exercised to amend the charter to· almost any extent to carry
into effect the original purposes of the corporate organization
and secure due administration of its affairs, or to repeal the
charter altogether, so as to terminate absolutely the existence
of the corporation by the abrogation of "the organic law on
which the corporate existence depends. "t But the exercise of
the power of amendment or repeal cannot deprive corporations
of their rights or property acquired by the use of their
*Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 213; Miller VB. State, 15 Wall.
478; Tomlinson va. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Shields w. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319;
Railway Co. VB. Maine, 96 U.S. 499; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700.
Railway Co. VB. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Railway vs. Philadelphia, 101
U.S. 539; Greenwood VB. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Spring Valley Water
Works VB. Schottler, 110 U.S. 348.
t Miller VB. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields VB. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319; Green·
wood VB. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 19.
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franchises.* Thus the rights of shareholders and creditors are

protected. So that the reserved power of amendment or repeal

19

is not unlimited, or destructive, or violative of vested rights.

To those whose indulgence in complaint of the encroach-

ments of corporations is somewhat sweeping, it may be fairly sug-

gested that the actual and practical operation of this reserved

legislative power is a restraint upon corporations much more

effectual than they are willing to acknowledge. The inquiry

by statistics is difficult, but we venture the statement that the

larger number of corporations existing in this country come

under legislative control by virtue of provisions in their

charters, or in the general laws or constitutions of the

states. In the majority of the states, constitutional provisions

forbid the granting of charters, except with a reservation of

the power of amendment or repeal. The day of special char-

ters is past. General laws, for the most part, are the basis

of corporate organization. The present tendency of legisla-

tion is not, to say the least, favorable to corporations. And

in estimating the necessity for more severe legislative action

concerning them, the extent of the^present control of them,

under the reserved power, should not be under-estimated.

And certainly, any criticism upon the effect of the Dart-

mouth College case, as encouraging corporate independence,

should not leave out of view the consistent maintenance of this

power by the Supreme Court.
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(4) It is well settled that the legislature may exercise the

power of eminent domain, to authorize the taking of the

property of corporations, including their franchises, upon due

compensation.f This principle places the most valuable and

exclusive rights and franchises of corporations under legislative

control, whenever the public interest appears to the legislature

* Miller vs. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Green-

wood vs. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 19.

t West River Bridge Co. vs. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond, etc., R. R.

Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Greenwood vs. Freight Co., 105 U.

S. 22; New Orleans Gas Light Co. vs. Louisiana, etc., Co., 115 U. S. 650.

franchises.* Thus the rights of shareholders and creditors are
protected. So that the reserved power of amendment or repeal
is not unlimited, or destructive, or violative of vested rights.
To those whose indulgence in complaint of the encroachments of corporations is somewhat sweeping, it may be fairly suggested that the actual and practical operation of this reserved
legislative power is a restraint upon corporations much more
effectual than they are willing to acknowledge. The inquiry
by statistics is difficult, but we venture the statement that the
larger number of corporations existing in this country come
under legislative control by virtue of provisions in their
charters, or in the general laws or constitutions of the
states. In the majority of the states, constitutional provisions
forbid the granting of charters, except with a reservation of
the power of amendment or repeal. The day of special charters is past. General laws, for the most part, are the basis
-0f corporate organization. The present tendency of legisla,; tion is not, to say the l~~-f~y_Q!a~le t~_ ~()r~~_!l:~i?ns. And
in estimating thelieCe8sity for more severe legislative action
concerning them, the extent of the:present control of them,
under the reserved power, should not be under-estimated.
And certainly, any criticism upon the effect of the Dartmouth College case, as encouraging corporate independence,
should not leave out of view the consistent maintenance of this
power by the Supreme Court.
(4) It is well settled that the legislature may exercise the
power of eminent domain, to authorize the taking of the
property of corporations, including their franchises, upon due
compensation. t This principle places the most valuable and
exclusive rights and franchises of corporations under legislative
control, whenever the public interest appears to the legislature
*Miller w. State, 15 Wall. 478 ; Shields VB. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Greenwood VB. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 19.
t West River Bridge Co. vs. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond, etc., R.R.
Co. VB. Louisa R.R. Co., 13 How. 71; Greenwood v1. Freight Co., 105 U.
S. 22; New Orleans Gas Light Co. vs. Louisiana, etc., Co., 115 U.S. 650.
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to require that new corporations should be organized, and the

constantly developing Necessities of growing and progressive

20

communities aided by new corporate undertakings. The prac-

tical operation of this principle is to keep the limits- of the

field of corporate exertion under the constant supervision

of legislation, and to leave to the determination of the

representatives of the people the question whether that field

should be enlarged or restricted at any particular period.

This end is subserved, and corporations which have acquired

vested rights and interests receive just compensation for what-

ever is taken from them.

(5) The most important adjudications which form a part of

the system of doctrine founded on the Dartmouth College case,

are the comparatively recent decisions which sustained the

exercise of the supervisory and controlling power of the legis-

lature in the "Warehouse " and " Granger" cases, so denomi-

nated. These have provoked wide discussion and earnest

criticism. They have been assailed by many in the profession;

they were accompanied by strong dissent on the part of the

to require that new corporations should be organized, and the
constantly developing ~ecessities of growing and progressive
communities aided by new corporate undertakings. The practical operation of this principle is to keep the limits- of the
field of corporate exertion under the constant supervision
of legislation, and to leave to the determination of the
representatives of the people the question whether that field
should be enlarged or restricted at any particular period.
'rhis end is subserved, and corporations which have acquired
vested rights and interests receive just compensation for whatever is taken from them.

minority of the court; they have been hailed with approval

and congratulation in large sections of the country where

public sentiment was most vigorous in antagonism to corpora-

tions; they have been regarded by many, in and out of the

profession, as inconsistent in reasoning and principle with

the leading case, as indicating a tendency in the court to re-
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view and reverse it, and as presaging its final abandonment

and overthrow.

These cases were as follows:

In Munn vs. Illinois,* the question was as to the power of

the legislature of Illinois to fix by law the maximum of charges

for the storage of grain in warehouses, at Chicago and other

places in the state having not less than one hundred thousand

inhabitants, and to require persons doing business as private

*94 U. S. 113.

(5) The most important adjudications which form a part of
the system of doctrine founded on the Dartmouth College case,
are the comparatively recent decisions which sustained the
exercise of the supervisory and controlling power of the legislature in the "Warehouse " and " Granger " cases, so denominated. These have provoked wide discussion and earnest
criticism. They have been assailed by rpaily in the profession;
they were accompanied by strong dissent on the part of the
minority of the court; they have been hailed with approval
and congratulation in large sections of the country where
public sentiment was most vigorous in antagonism to corporations; they have been regarded by many, in and out of the
profession, as inconsistent in reasoning and principle with
the leading case, as indicating a tendency in the court to review and reverse it, and as presaging its final abandonment
and overthrow.
These cases were as follows :
In Munn vs. Illinois,* the question was as to the power of
the legislature of Illinois to fix by law the maximum of charges
for the storage of grain in warehouses, at Chicago and other
places in the state having not less than one hundred thousand
inhabitants, and to require persons doing business as private
*94 u. s. 113.
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warehousemen to take out a license for such business, and to

declare the business to be that of public warehousemen. The

21

constitutionality of such legislation was sustained, and it was

held that "where private property is devoted to a public use

it is subject to public regulation;" that "property does become

clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make

it of public consequence and affect the community at large.

When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which

the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an

interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the

public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he

has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discon-

tinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must

submit to the control."

The "Granger Cases "* involved a consideration of the

charters of different railroad companies and the extent of the

power of the legislature in the regulation of their charges, as well

in the absence of any reservation of a right to alter or repeal

them, as where such reservation was embodied in the charters

or in the constitutions or laws under which they were granted.

These cases decided that railroads are subject to the super-

vision and control of the legislature, like all carriers at com-

mon law, being engaged in a public employment affecting the

public interest, and, therefore, under the decision of Munn vs.

Illinois, subject to legislation as to their rates of fare and
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freight, unless protected by their charters; that in the absence

of charter-contracts the charges by railroad companies for

services within the state may be limited by the legislature

and a maximum of charges prescribed; that where the state

constitution reserves a right of amendment or repeal, the

legislature may prescribe a maximum, although the charter

•Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. vs. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik

vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., Ibid. 164; Chicago, Milwaukee,

& St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. Ackley, Ibid. 179; Winona & St. Peter R. R.

Co. «8. Blake, Ibid. 180; Stone vs. Wisconsin, Ibid. 181; Ruggles vs.

Illinois, 108 U. S. 526.

warehousemen to take out a license for such business, and to
declare the business to be that of public warehousemen. The
constitutionality of such legislation was sustained, and it was
held that "where private property is devoted to a public use
it is subject to public regulation;" that "property does become
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make
it of' public consequence and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in eftect, grants to the public an
interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must
submit to the control."
The "Granger Cases"* involved a consideratiqn of the
charters of different railroad companies and the extent of the
power of the legislature in the regulation of their charges, as well
in the absence of any reservation of a right to alter or repeal
them, as ·where such reservation was embodied in the charters
or in the constitutions or laws under which they were granted.
These cases decided that railroads are subject to the supervision and control of the legislature, like all carriers at common law, being engaged in a public employment affecting the
public interest, and, therefore, under the decision of Munn vs.
Illinois, subject to legislation as to their rates of far~ and
freight, unles~ protected by their charters; that in the absence
of charter-contracts the charges by railroad companies for
services within the state may be limited by the legislature
and a maximum of charges prescribed; that where the state
constitution reserves a right of amendment or repeal, the
legislature may prescribe a maximum, although the charter
*Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. vs. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik
tis. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., Ibid. 164; Chicago, Milwaukee,
& St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. Ackley, nW. li9; Winona & St. Peter R. R.
Co. t1s. Blake, Ibid. 180; Stone i·s. Wisconsin, Ibid. 181 ; Ruggles vs.
Illinois, 108 U. S. 526.
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authorizes such charges as are reasonable; that more than the

22

maximum fixed by the legislature cannot be recovered by the

company by showing that the amount charged was no more

than reasonable for the services.

Taken together, these decisions assert the complete power

of legislative regulation, whenever the business of the corpora-

tion is of such a nature, in the judgment of the court, as to

affect the public interest.

The "Railroad Commission Cases,"* decided at the last

term of the court, affirm the "Granger Cases" and go

beyond them, sustaining the validity of a statute regulating

rates of transportation and creating a state board of commis-

sioners to supervise and enforce the same. The court holds

that the creation of such a board does not violate the charter

right of the corporation to manage its affairs through its own

directors; that statutes regulating rates of charges do not

deprive corporations of their property without due process of

law; but it is declared that the power of regulation is not a

power to destroy, that limitation is not equivalent to confisca-

tion, and that under pretence of regulating charges, the state

could not require a corporation to carry without reward nor

do that which amounts in law to taking private property for

public use without just compensation or due process of law.

As no tariff of charges had been fixed by the commission in

question, the court declines to say what action of the commis-
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sion would have this effect. The power of regulation is

declared to be one which cannot be bargained away without

express grant. Justices Harlan and Field, dissenting, regard

the statute in question as one impairing the charter-contract

with the company and their right under the charter to fix

their own charges and manage their own affairs through their

own directors, officers and agents, though they concede that

statutes may be valid establishing railroad commissions for

many purposes.

*116 U. S. 307.

authorizes such charges as are reasonable ; that more than the
maximum fixed by the legislature cannot be recovered by the
company by showing that the amount charged was no more
than reasonable for the servic~s.
Taken together, these decisions assert the complete power
of legislative regulation, whenever the business of the corporation is of such a nature, in the judgment of the court, as to
taffect the public interest.
\ / The "Railroad Commission Cases,"* decided at the last
/ " \ term of the court, affirm the " Granger Cases " and go
beyond them, sustaining the validity of a statute regulating
rates of transportation and creating a state board of commissioners to supervise and enforce the same. The court holds
that the creation of such a board does not violate the charter
right ofthe corporation to manage its affairs through its own
directors ; that statutes regulating rates of charges do not
deprive corporations of their property without due process of
law; but it is declared that the power of regulation is not a
power to destroy, that limitation is not equivalent to confiscation, and that under pretence of regulating charges, the state
could not require a corporation to carry without reward nor
do that which amounts in law to taking private property for
public use without just compensation or due process of law.
As no tariff of charges had been fixed by the commission in
question, the court declines to say what action of the commission would have this effect. The power of .regulation is
declared to be one which cannot be bargained away without
express grant. Justices Harlan and Field, dissenting, regard
the statute in question as one impairing the charter-contract
with the company and their right ·under the charter to fix
their own charges and manage their own affairs through their
own directors, officers and agents, though they concede that
statutes may be valid establishing railroad commissions for
many purposes.

y,.. *
../.."

116

u. s. 307.

These decisions assert principles which have not received,

and, as we believe, cannot receive, the assent of the most

weighty professional opinion. The reasoning of the dissent-
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I

ing opinions seems to us to be unanswerable. These express,

with cogent logic, abundant authority and masterly strength,

the consequences of a doctrine that the legislative power can

be unchecked, in its interference with business essentially

private, or its prescription of the compensation which private

and corporate owners shall receive for the use of their pro-

perty. Without such decisions, all the rights of regulation of

the use of property, and to prevent its abuse to the injury of

the public, and for the protection of the public interest, can

be effectually preserved, in all cases where special privileges

are granted, under settled principles as to the exercise of the

police power. To state the reasons of our conviction would

be only to repeat the larger portions of the dissenting opin-

ions. The decisions seem to us to be "subversive of the

rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected

by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference;"

they hold that "all property and all business of the state are

held at the mercy of the legislature;" they deprive private

and corporate owners of their property absolutely, although

under the guise of mere regulations as to its use and employ-

ment and non-interference with its title and possession. It

seems indisputable that "If the legislature of a state under

pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other
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reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the

uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices

which the owner shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him

of the property as completely as by a special act for its con-

fiscation or destruction." "There is, indeed, no protection

of any value, under the constitutional provision, which does

not extend to the use and income of the property, as well as

to its title and possession."

It is difficult to resist the conviction that the court, in

deciding these, cases, was not altogether insensible to the

These decisions assert principles which have not received,
and, as we believe, cannot receive, the assent of the most
weighty professional opinion. 1he reasoning of the dissenting opinions seems to us to be unanswerable. These express,
with cogent logic, abundant authority and masterly strength,
the consequences of a doctrine that the legislative power can
be unchecked, in its interference with business essentially
private, or its prescription of the compensation which private
and corporate owners shall receive for the use of their pro-perty. Without such decisions, all the rights of regulation of
the use of property, and to prevent its abuse to the injury of
the public, and for the protection,of the public interest, can
be effectually preserved, in all cases where special privileges
are granted, under settled principles as to the exercise of the
police power. To state the reasons of our conviction would
be only to repeat the larger portions of the dissenting opinions. The decisions seem to us to be " subversive of the
rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected
by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference (
they hold that " all property and all business of the state are
held at the mercy of the legislature;" they deprive private
and corporate owners of their property absolutely, although
under the guise of mere regulations as to its use and employment and non-interference with its title and possession. It
seems indisputable that "If the legislature of a state under
pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other
reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the
uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices
which the owner shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him
of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation or destruction." " There is, indeed, no protection
of any value, under the constitutional provision, which does
not extend to the use and income of the property, as well as
to its title and possession."
It is difficult to resist the conviction that the court, in
deciding these, cases, was not altogether insensible to the

24

pressure of that public sentiment which prevailed at the time

—the " Granger" sentiment of the Great West.

24

That the principles of these decisions are inconsistent with

the reasoning of the Dartmouth College case, is maintained

in the dissenting opinions and insisted upon by professional

criticism. The question "to what purpose can the constitu-

tional prohibition upon the states, against impairing the obli-

gation of contracts, be invoked, if the state can, in the face of

a charter authorizing a company to charge reasonable rates, -

prescribe what rates shall be deemed reasonable for services

rendered," can receive, it seems to us, but one answer, viz.,

the constitutional inhibition is of no effect. It is true that

the court expressly declares its adherence to the leading

case; that it holds that the railroad charters in question con-

tained no contracts; that it considers that the College case

and the " Granger Cases," can stand together; and certainly,

so far as establishing the law is concerned, the court is the

final judge of its own consistency. But it seems to us that

the principle of these cases, that the use of property affecting

the public generally clothes it with a public interest, conflicts

with the decision that the college was a purely private cor-

poration; that the decisions tend to justify unchecked legisla-

tive control of all private corporations; that the reasoning of

the court is inconsistent with the protection of the contracts

even where the charters expressly contain them, and tends to
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allow the impairment of the contracts of corporations with

third persons, especially where securities have been issued

■upon corporate property.

The legislative regulation of corporations, thus maintained,

is based upon the nature of the business carried on. The

court establishes the general principle that whenever such

business is of public consequence, and affects the community

generally, the legislative power is complete to regulate. If

individuals or corporations devote their property to uses in

which the public has an interest, there is, in effect, a presumed

pressure of that public sentiment which prevailed at the time
-the " Granger " sentiment of the Great 'Vest.
That the principles of these decisions are inconsistent with
the reasoning of the Dartmouth College case, is maintained
in the dissenting opinions and insisted upon by professional
criticism. The question "to what purpose can the constitutional prohibition upon the states, against impairing the obligation of contracts, be invoked, if the state can, in the face of
a charter authorizing a company to charge reasonable rates, '
prescribe what rates shall be . deemed reasonable for services
rendered," can receive, it seems to us, but one answer, viz.,
the constitutional inhibition is of no effect. It is true that
the court expressly declares its adherence to the leading
case; that it holds that the railroad charters in question contained no contracts ; that it considers that the .College case
and the "Granger Cases," can stand together; and certainly,
so far as establisP.ing t4e law is concerned, the court is the
final judge of its own consistency. But it seems to us that
the principle of these cases, that the use of property affecting
the public generally clothes it with a public interest, conflicts
with the decision that the college was a purely private corporation; that the decisions tend to justify unchecked legislative control of all private corporations ; that the reasoning of
the court is inconsistent with the protection of the contracts
even where the charters expressly contain them, and tends to
allow the impairment of the contracts of corporations with
, third persons, especially where securities have been issued
upon corporate property.
The legislative regulation of corporations, thus maintained,
is based upon the nature of the business carried on. The
court establishes the general principle that whenever such
business is of public consequence, and affects the community
generally, the legislative power is complete to regulate. If
individuals or corporations devote their property to uses in
which the public has an interest, there is, in effect, a presumed
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dedication of the property to public use, and an implied

submission, on the part of the owners, to legislative control or

25

the public good. The limits of this power of regulation, there-

fore, depend upon what the court may determine, in every

case, as to the nature of the business. These limits are unde-

fined, and although the court plants itself, professedly, upon

the principle of dedication to public use, and an implied con-

sent of the owners of the property, many regard the virtual

ground of decision to be the police power, which is generally

exercised in invitum. But the declared opinions of the court

must be accepted as to the ground of their decision. The

power of regulation is, therefore, left to the combined deter-

mination of the legislative and judicial authority as to the

nature of the business, The most recent decisions, presently

to be noticed, show that the court asserts its power to deter-

mine, in every case, what is business of a public nature, and

what is ordinary business, and when and to what extent the

police power may be exercised in respect to it. But may it

not be fairly asked, is not this power of regulation equivalent,

as thus asserted, to the power of the legislature over public

corporations, and are not corporations virtually held to be

public whenever it can be found that the business or purposes

of the corporate organization affect the community generally?

The importance of the results of these decisions, alike to

corporations and to the public, has been demonstrated in the
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period which has elapsed since they were announced. Upon

the former they have had marked effect in discouraging cor-

porate investments, and have rendered corporate rights and

franchises less valuable. Whether the public has derived from

the decisions the benefit claimed for them is at least open to

question. That part of the people which is most hostile to

corporations finds, in these decisions, encouragement for the

expectation that the court will, at no distant day, reverse the

principal case, an event by which it is supposed a millenium of

relief for a corporation-oppressed people will at last arrive.

dedication of the property to public use, and an implied
submission, on the part of the owners, to legislative control or
the public good. The limits of this power of regulation, therefore, depend upon what the court may determine, in every
case, as to the n~ture of the business. These limits are undefined, and although the court plants itself, professedly, upon
the principle of dedication to public use, and an implied consent of the owners of the property, many regard the virtual
ground of decision to be the police power, which is generally
exercised in invitum. But the declared opinions of the court
must be accepted as to the ground of their decision. The
power of regulation is, therefore, left to the combined determination of the legislative and judicial authority as to the
~ature of the business. The most recent decisions, presently
to be noticed, show that the court asserts its power to determine, in every case, what is business of a public nature, and
what is ordinary business, and when and to what extent the
police power may be exercised in respect to it. But may it
not be fairly asked, is not this power of regulation equivalent,
as thus asserted, to the power of the legislature over public
corporations, and are not corporations virtually held to be
public whenever it can be found that the business or purposes
of the corporate organization affect the community generally ?
The importance of the results of these decisions, alike to
corporations and to the public, has been demonstrated in the
period which has elapsed since they were announced. Upon
the former they have_had marked effect in discouraging corporate investments, and have rendered corporate rights and
franchises less valuable. Whether the public has derived from
the decisions the benefit claimed for them is at least open to
question. That part of the people which is most hostile to
corporations finds, in these decisions, ~ncouragement for the
expectation that the court will, at no distant day, reverse the
principal case, an event by which it is supposed a millenium of
relief for a corporation-oppressed people will at last arrive.
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(6) In cases subsequent to the " Granger Cases," where the

constitutional protection of contracts was invoked in behalf of

26

corporations carrying on business injurious to the public health

or morals, the court has declared the principles governing the

exercise of the police power, and decided that charter-contracts

do not preclude the legislature from enacting such laws as are

necessary for the protection of the public; that the legislature

"cannot bargain away the public health or public morals,"

and that authority granted by statute to corporations or in-

dividuals to engage in particular private business detrimental

to the public, does not constitute a contract preventing the

withdrawal of such authority.*

(7) So, in a later case, the principle of the leading case has

been urged to protect the corporations from legislation concern-

ing their business intended for the security of persons dealing

with them, such as statutes regulating the business of life

insurance companies. Such legislation was held not to be

within the constitutional inhibition. It was decided that all

grants of corporate privileges and franchises are subject to the

condition that they shall not be abused, nor employed to de-

(6) In cases subsequent to the "Granger Cases," where the
constitutional protection of contracts was invoked in behalf of
corporations carrying on business injurious to the public health
or morals, the court has declared the principles governing the
exercise of the police power, and decided that ()barter-contracts
do not preclude the legislature from enacting such laws as are
necessary for the protection of the public ; that the legislature
"cannot bargain away the public health or public morals,"
and that authority granted by statute to corporations or individuals to engage in particular private business detrimental
to the public, does not constitute a contract preventing the
withdrawal of such authority.*

I
I
I

feat the ends for which they were conferred, and to an equally

implied condition that the legislature may prescribe such

reasonable regulations as will secure the ends for which the

corporation is organized, provided such regulations do not

interfere with or obstruct the enjoyment of the corporate
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privileges. This principle is expressly declared to be essential

to the protection of the public against perils arising from the

ignorance, misconduct or fraud of those who manage corpora-

tions^

(8) The decisions in the New Orleans Gas and Water

* Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. vs. Hyde Park,

Ibid. 660; Boyd vs. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645; Stone vs. Mississippi, 101

U. S. 814; Butchers' Union Co. vs. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 746.

t Chicago Life Ins. Co. vs. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; and see The Sinking

Fund Cases, ubi supra.

(7) So, in a later case, the principle of the leading case has
been urged to protect the corporations from legislation concerning their business intended for the security of persons dealing
with them, such as statutes regulating the business of life
insurance companies. Such legislation was held not to be
within the constitutional inhibition. It was decided that all
grants of corporate privileges and franchises are subject to the
condition that they shall not be abused, nor employed to defeat the ends for which they were conferred, and to an equally
implied condition that the legislature may prescribe such
reasonable regulations as will secure the ends for which the
corporation is organized, provided such regulations do not
interfere with or obstruct the enjoyment of the corporate
privileges. This principle is expressly declared to be essential
to the protection of the public against perils arising from the
ignorance, misconduct or fraud of those who manage corporations. t
(8) The decisions in the New Orleans Gas and Water
*Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25; Fertilizing Co. VB. Hyde Park,
Ibid. 660; Boyd VB. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 ; Stone VB. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814; Butchera' Union Co. VB. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746.
t Chica.go Life Ins. Co. vs. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; and see The Sinking
Fund Cases, ubi supra.
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cases,* at the last term of the court, maintain anew the validity

27

of exclusive charters as contracts, and declare the consistency

of all previous adjudications with the complete exercise of the

police power by the state, to protect the public health, the

public morals and the public safety. These cases involved the

validity of charters granting to private corporations exclusive

privileges to supply the city of New Orleans with gas and

water by means of pipes, mains and other conduits laid in the

public streets of the city. The court held that such charters

were contracts, which could not be impaired by subsequent

constitutional provisions by the state; that the business to be

carried on was of a public character; that the power of a

subsequent legislature to recall such grants could be limited by

the charter-contracts, and exclusive privileges granted in such

cases stand upon the same principle as exclusive grants to con-

struct and maintain highways, bridges and ferries, and exemp-

tion from taxation by charters; that the former decisions of

the court (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, Fertilizing Co. vs.

Hyde Park and Stone vs. Mississippi) sustaining the exercise

of the police power, rest on the principle that one legislature

cannot limit the power of its successors in relation to private

business affecting the public health or morals; that authority

given by the legislature to corporations or individuals to en-

gage in such particular private business does not constitute a

contract preventing withdrawal of such authority or the grant-
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ing of it to others; but that the business of supplying a

city with gas or water is not ordinary business in which every-

one may engage, but is of a public nature; and that even in

such case a grant of exclusive privileges doesJ not withdraw

the business from the control of the police power, when the

public health, morals or safety require its exercise.

These decisions affirm again the adherence of the court to

the Dartmouth College case, but assert for the court the

power to determine in every case whether the nature of the

*115 U. S. 650-674.

cases,* at the last term of the court, maintain anew the validity
of exclusive charters as contracts, and declare the consistency
of all previous adjudications with the complete exercise of the
police power by the state, to protect the public health, the
public morals and the public safety. These cases involved the
validity of charters granting to private corporations exclusive
privileges to supply the city of New Orleans with gas and
water by means of pipes, mains and other conduits laid in the
public streets of the city. The court held that such charters
were contracts, which could not be impaired by subsequent
constitutional provisions by the state ; that the business to be
carried on was of a public character ; that the power of a
subsequent legislature to recall such grants could be limited by
the charter-contracts, and exclusive privileges granted in such
cases stand upon the same principle as exclusive grants to construct and maintain highways, bridges and ferries, and exemption from taxation by charters ; that the former decisions of
the court (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, Fertilizing Co. vs.
Hyde Park and Stone vs. Mississippi) sustaining the exercise
of_ the .E~~-~~,.I>.~!~!l- rest on the principle that one legislature
1
cannot limit the power of its successors in relation to private
business affecting the public health or morals ; that authority
given by the legislature to corporations or individuals to engage in such particular private business does not constitute a
contract preventing withdrawal of such authority or the granting of it to others; but that the business of supplying a
city with gas or water is not ordinary business in which everyxone may engage, but i_~_ ,of ..,~-P~~-li~-~~- and that even in
' such case a grant of exclusive privileges Mes' not withdraw
the business from the control of the police power, when the
public health, morals or safety require its exercise.
These decisions affirm again the adherence of the court to
the Dartmouth College case, but assert for the court the
power to determine in every case whether the nature of the
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business is private or public, and, consequently, when the

police power may be applied. These cases, by those who hold

28

that the decisions of the court cannot be reconciled, will be

regarded as strengthening their view of the court's inconsistency,

and as they consider the "Granger Cases" to be a radical

departure from the principal case,- they will only find in these

recent decisions a new and variant step, not in the path of con-

sistent legal principles. They will not hesitate, therefore, to

insist that the court, in every future case, as in its later adju-

dications, will decide as their views of public policy at the time

may require.

But if we can conceive the court, for a moment, as defending

their own course of decision, they would say, "The settled

law upholds the true purpose of the constitutional inhibition,

rightly protects the just rights of corporations, secures due

administration of their affairs, and consistently maintains the

integrity of the sovereign powers of the state, the police

power, the power of eminent domain, the reserved power of

amendment and repeal, and thus establishes sufficient and

effectual restraints upon corporations."

IV. This survey and examination of the principles estab-

lished as law by the leading case and succeeding decisions

resting upon it, considered together, has been undertaken with

a purpose to exhibit a connected view of the system, if it may

properly be so regarded. By such a view we may better esti-
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mate the force and conclusiveness of the criticism which has

assailed the original decision and its consequences, and which

will continue, probably, to arraign the court before the bar of

public opinion. Public opinion, sooner or later, insensibly

moulds the law.* Whatever we may desire as lawyers,

*'"Public opinion may and does review the constitutional doctrines an-

nounced and acted upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, and

business is prfrate or public, and, consequently, when the
police power may be applied. These cases, by those who hold
that the decisions of the court cannot be reconciled, will be
regarded as strengthening their view of the court's inconsistency,
and as they consider the " Granger Cases " to be a radical
departure from the principal case; they will only find in these
recent decisions a new and variant step, not in the path of consistent legal principles. They will not hesitate, therefore, to
insist that the court, in every future case, as in its later adjudications, will decide as their views of public policy at the time
may require.
But if w.e can conceive the court, for a moment, as defending .
their own course of decision, they would say, "The settled
law upholds the true purpose of the constitutional inhibition,
rightly protects the just rights of corporations, secures due
administration of their affairs, and consistently maintains the
integrity of the sovereign powers of the state, the police
power, the power of eminent domain, the reserved power of
amendment and repeal, and thus establishes sufficient and
effectual restraints upon corporations."

sometimes this review has been followed by very practical consequences."

Geo. Ticknor Curtis, in his discussion of "The Doctrine of Presumed

Dedication of Private Property to Public Use" (John Wiley & Sons,

N. Y., 1881), citing " The Dred Scott Case."

IV. This survey and examination of the principles established as law by the leading case and succeeding decisions
resting upon it, considered together, has been undertaken with
a purpose to exhibit a connected view o,f the system, if it may
properly be so regarded. By such a view we may better estimate the force and conclusiveness of the criticism which has
assailed the original decision and its consequences, and which
will continue, probably, to arraign the court before the bar of
public opinion. Public opinion, sooner or later, insensibly
moulds the law.* Whatever we .may desire a~ lawyers,
*"Public opinion may and does review the constitutional doctrines announced and acted upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
sometimes this review has been followed by very practical consequences."
Geo. Ticknor Curtis, in his discm1sion of "The Doctrine of Presumed
Dedication of Private Property to Public Use" (John Wiley & Sons,
N . Y., 1881), citing" The Dred Scott Case."
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however much we may wish that the judicial tribunals shall be

above the reach of popular opinion, nevertheless they are in-
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fluenced by it. The law is the outgrowth of the necessities of

the community. It is idle for the profession to ignore the

serious charge that by reason of the decision in the Dartmouth

College case, corporations possess almost sovereign powers,

and that the doctrine of an inviolable charter-contract has

suspended, in their favor, the exercise of the sovereign powers

of the state. This charge must be met according to its

gravity; it must be considered whether the need of restraint

upon corporations is increasing or diminishing, and where the

remedies for corporate abuses and aggression are to be found,

if required. But this inquiry will not be prosecuted, either

in the legal profession or in the judicial tribunals, in any

spirit of undiscriminating enmity to corporations. The incal-

culable benefits they have conferred upon the country, the

great work they have performed in its progress and devel-

opment, are manifest. The legal profession can do much to

influence and guide public opinion; to show that the demand

for the reversal of the Dartmouth College case is impractica-

ble; to maintain the integrity and permanence of principles

which are, to say the least, settled law; to inculcate that

respect for the highest judicial tribunal of the country to

which it is entitled by its position, its history and the purity,

abilities and-learning of the judges. This may be done, and
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ample room will be left for free and enlightened criticism of

its decisions. It is a reasonable expectation that the law will

be finally settled in such a way as to reconcile complete pro-

tection of corporate rights and vested interests with the unim-

paired exercise of the sovereign powers of the state. The

majority of the court regard that as even now accomplished,

but as to this there is a wide difference of opinion. One of

the judges who has most strenuously resisted the doctrine that

the taxing power can be restricted by charter-contract, pre-

dicts that it must be finally abandoned.* Whether this can

* Miller, J. in Washington University vs. Kouse, 8 Wall. 444.

however much we may wish that the judicial tribunals shall be
above the reach of popular opinion, nevertheless they are influenced by it. The law is the outgrowth of the necessities of
the community. It is idle for the profession to ignore the
serious charge that by reason of the decision in the Dartmouth
College case, corporations possess almost sovereign
powers,
---..:.
and that the doctrine of an inviolable charter-contract has
suspended, in their favor, the exercise of the sovereign powers
of the state. This charge must be met according to its
gravity; it must be considered whether the need of restraint
upon corporations is increasing or diminishing, and where. the
remedies for corporate abuses and aggression are to be found,
, if required. But this inquiry will not be prosecuted, either
in the legal profession or in the judicial tribunals, in any
spirit of undiscriminating enmity to corporations. The incalculable benefits they have conferred upon the country, the
great work they have performed in its progress and development, are manifest. The legal profession can do much to
influence and guide public opinion ; to show that the demand
for the reversal ~f the Dartmouth College case is impracticable; to maintain the integrity and permanence of. principles
which are, to say the least, settled law ; to inculcate that
respect for the highest judicial tribunal of the country to
which it is entitled by its position, its history and the purity,
abilities and· learning of the judges. This may be done, and
ample room will be left for free and enlightened criticism of
its decisions. It is a. reasonable expectation that the law will
be finally settled in such a way as to reconcile complete protection of corporate rights and vested interests with the unimpaired exercise of the sovereign powers of the state. The
majority of the court regard that as even now accomplished,
but as to this there is a wide difference of opinion. One of
the judges who has most strenuously resisted the doctrine that
the taxing power can be restricted by charter-contract, predicts that it must be finally abandoned.* Whether this can
*Miller, J. in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 444.
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be done without overthrowing the whole system of decisions is

doubtful; because, as we have seen, the taxation cases are
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those wherein the principle that a charter is a contract has

been most frequently and explicitly affirmed. If the prin-

cipal case is not reversed, still less is it probable that the

remedy suggested by the most earnest of its opponents, an

amendment of the Federal Constitution, will be attained. It

would be resisted by all the power of corporations, and such a

measure could not be enacted unless by practical unanimity

of all public interests and general concurrence of professional

and public sentiment. If the aims, the ambitions, the inde-

pendence of corporations should continue to be aggressive, and

become dangerous to the public welfare, remedies must and

will be found. What these shall be is not within the scope

of the present discussion.

As lawyers and as citizens we may indulge the hope that

these questions will be determined and these contentions com-

posed, with complete conservation of the judicial and legisla-

tive powers of government, and with just regard for the

interests of corporations, the protection of the public, and the
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welfare and progress of the nation.

be done without overthrowing the whole system of decisions is
doubtful; because, as we haYe seen, the taxation cases are
those wherein the principle that a charter is a contract has
been most frequently and explicitly affirmed. If the principal case is not reversed, still less is it probable that the
remedy suggested by the most earnest of its opponents, an
amendment of the Federal Constitution, will be attained. It
would be resisted by all the power of corporations, and such a
measure could not be enacted unless by practical unanimity
of all public interests and general concurrence of professional
and public sentiment. If the aims, the ambitions, the independence of corporations should continue to be aggressive, and
become dangerous to the public welfare, remedies must and
will be found. 'Vhat these shall be is not within the scope
of the present discussion.
As lawyers and as citizens we may indulge the hope that
these questions will be determined and these contentions composed, with complete conservation of the judicial and legislative powers of government, and with just regard for the
interests of corporations, the protection of the public, and the
welfare and progress of the nation.

